Introduction
The relationship between classical liberalism and technology is surprisingly fraught. The common understanding is that technological advance is complementary to the principles of classical liberalism -especially in the case of contemporary, information-age technology. 1 This is most clearly on display in Silicon Valley, with its oft-professed libertarian (classical liberalism's kissing cousin) affinities. The analytical predicate for this complementarity is that classical liberalism values liberty-enhancing private ordering, and technological advance both is generally facially liberty-enhancing and facilitates private ordering. 1 This chapter focuses on "contemporary technology." That is, generally, those technologies associated with the information revolution of the past generation: computers, the Internet, and related information communications and processing technologies. A treatment of the relationship between classical liberalism and a more generalized concept of technology is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is, however, the authors' view that the discussion offered here is relevant to such a broader conceptualization. This analysis, however, is incomplete. Classical liberalism recognizes that certain rules are necessary in a well-functioning polity. 2 The classical liberal, for instance, recognizes the centrality of enforceable property rights, and the concomitant ability to seek recourse from a third party (the state) when those rights are compromised. Thus, contemporary technological advances may facilitate private transactions -but such transactions may not support private ordering if they also weaken either the property rights necessary to that ordering or the enforceability of those rights.
This chapter argues that technological advance can at times create (or, perhaps more accurately, highlight) a tension within principles of classical liberalism: It can simultaneously enhance liberty, while also undermining the legal rules and institutions necessary for the efficient and just private ordering of interactions in a liberal society. This is an important tension for classical liberals to understand -and one that needs to be, but too rarely is, acknowledged or struggled with. Related, the chapter also identifies and evaluates important fracture lines between prevalent branches of modern libertarianism: those that tend to embrace technological anarchism as maximally liberty-enhancing, on the one hand, and those that more cautiously protect the legal institutions (for example, property rights) upon which individual autonomy and private ordering are based, on the other. 2 See, for example, JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT at §57 (" [T] he end of the law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For … where there is no law there is no freedom."); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES AND ORDER (1978) at 33 ("Liberalism … restricts deliberate control of the overall order of society to the enforcement of such general rules as are necessary for the formation of a spontaneous order, the details of which we cannot foresee.").
This chapter proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces our understanding of classical liberalism's core principles: an emphasis on individual liberty; the recognition of a limit to the exercise of liberty when it conflicts with the autonomy of others; and support for a minimal set of rules necessary to coordinate individuals' exercise of their liberty in autonomy-respecting ways through a system of private ordering. Part II then offers an initial discussion of the relationship between technology and legal institutions and argues that technology is important to classical liberalism insofar as it affects the legal institutions upon which private ordering is based. Part III explores how libertarian philosophies have embraced contemporary technology, focusing on "extreme" and "moderate" views -views that correspond roughly to liberty maximalism and autonomy protectionism. This discussion sets the stage for Part IV, which considers the tensions that technological change -especially the rapid change that characterizes much of recent history -creates within the classical liberal philosophy. The central insight is that classical liberalism posits a set of relatively stable legal institutions as the basis for liberty-enhancing private ordering -institutions that are generally developed through public, not private ordering -but that technology, including otherwise liberty-enhancing technology, can disrupt these institutions in ways that threaten both individual autonomy and the private ordering built upon extant institutions.
I What Is Classical Liberalism? A TechnologyRelevant Account
It may seem unnecessary to provide a background understanding of classical liberalism in a single chapter in an entire book on the subject. But, although the general contours are consistent, there is no universally acknowledged statement of the principles that define classical liberalism and they vary enough from understanding to understanding that it is useful to define how the term is used here. Moreover, the discussion that follows addresses how technology affects what we think of as certain of the defining characteristics of classical liberalism.
As such, it is particularly useful for us to place these characteristics on the table and explain their importance before considering how technology may affect them.
At the outset, it is worth clearly stating, as a matter of discursive convenience, that we classify classical liberalism and libertarianism as closely related but distinct philosophies, where libertarianism encompasses a more restrictive view on what is properly the purview of the state. This is not intended to be analytically rigorous nor a complete characterization of either. Rather, it is based in the recognition that many technologists, both in academia and in industry, style themselves as libertarian (or "cyberlibertarian") , and that there is a certain complementarity between some of these views and our understanding of classical liberalism. The views of self-styled libertarian technologists therefore present a useful frame through which to consider the broader features of the classical liberal understanding of technology.
Other contributions to this volume discuss the origins and principles of classical liberalism in more detail and with more sophistication than is required here. For our purposes, it is enough to explain classical liberalism as a political philosophy that values reliance on a minimal set of autonomy-respecting rules to facilitate voluntary, welfare-enhancing transactions between individuals. 3 By and large, these "autonomy-respecting rules" are property rights. 4 Importantly, this sets up an inherent tension in classical liberalism.
Property is not the same thing as liberty and, in fact, it is a constraint on liberty.
The nineteenth century French anarchist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, famously declared that " [p] roperty is theft!" 5 and, in a sense, it is: By recognizing or by defining and assigning property rights (and by enforcing them), the government 3 Among many other sources for this general conception of classical liberalism, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things Apply": Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 Harvard LAW REVIEW 1300, 1302 (2002) ("[A] strong (but not absolute) institutional preference for consensual over forced exchanges; the legal system should find the former presumptively acceptable and the latter presumptively unacceptable. From this framework, we can mount a defense of private property and freedom of contract, subject to the usual provisos regarding the role of government in protecting individuals against the use of force and fraud, regulating monopoly, and providing public infrastructure."). 4 In the economic sense, as much as the legal sense, insofar as they But just as importantly, the benefits of property are enjoyed by everyone.
The system is decentralized such that anyone may, in principle, claim a property right over whatever she chooses provided she is the first to, say, possesses a piece of land, or otherwise assert her right as the result of voluntary exchange or by operation of law. Moreover, the incentives to invest, hire workers, produce things of value, and trade enabled by a system of property rights result in widespread social benefit. For classical liberals, the justification for the constraint on liberty entailed by property rights arises not from an appeal to natural order, but from the perceived social advantage it confers. As Richard Epstein has written:
[T]hese rights are defensible because they help advance human happiness in a wide range of circumstances, so that their creation under a set of general prospective rules satisfies the most exacting of social criterion. They tend to leave no one worse off than in a state of nature, and indeed tend to spread their net benefits broadly over the entire population-including both those who gain property rights under the standard rules of acquisition by first possession, and those who participate in the system only through the ownership of their own labor and their ability to enter into voluntary transactions with all individuals for the exchange of labor, property or both. 6 Such a system has at least two important characteristics. order their conduct. The key virtue of such a system is that it does not presuppose the existence of an external decision maker with sufficient knowledge, ability, and incentive to order the affairs of others. And, again, such a system has the virtue of being morally sound: Whereas a system that relies upon an external decision maker must empower that decision maker to use (potentially arbitrary) force to implement its social ordering in the face of intransigent parties, classical liberalism advances a system in which transactions are voluntarily achieved by virtue of mutually beneficial exchange.
In part because of its preference for private ordering, classical liberalism is often characterized as being opposed to government regulation and espousing extreme views of regulatory minimalism. But such characterizations are overly simplistic and fundamentally wrong. Classical liberalism properly understood both requires and respects strong legal institutions -particularly well-defined property rights -in order to facilitate and enforce the private ordering that is its sine qua non. Moreover, many classical liberals recognize that the system of private ordering espoused by classical liberalism necessarily advances only allocatively efficient transactions; it does not necessarily promote distributive efficiency, and such distributional adjustments of wealth by government may be necessary on the back end of the system. 9 And classical liberalism may even admit of the possibility of regulatory intervention through public law institutions where private legal institutions are insufficient or relatively inefficient. 10 9 See, for example, Hayek's discussion of the potential need for some form of welfare programs in sufficiently wealthy societies. F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 133-35 (1994 Welfare economics offers a useful lens for understanding classical liberalism's concern with individual autonomy. An important concept in welfare economics is the distinction between Pareto-efficient transactions and KaldorHicks-efficient transactions. A Pareto-improving transaction is one that makes at least one party better off without making any parties worse off. For instance, Orlando has an apple but prefers oranges; Alice has an orange but prefers apples.
If Orlando and Alice exchange fruits, each is better off (and neither is worse off).
In a transaction that is Kaldor-Hicks-efficient, however, parties may be made worse off provided that, on net, society is made better off. Thus, Orlando has no regulatory regime for the management of damages from small amounts of pollution affecting a large number of parties).
11 See, for example, Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 16, 21-22 (1973 14 On Merrill and Smith's account, in rem rights provide a way of minimizing the overall information costs associated with these disputes because the locus of ownership is fixed on the property itself. In the end, what matters in a particular dispute is which party gets the right to use a piece of property; but the way you arrive at that conclusion matters a good deal. If rights to use were always attached to individuals, the disputes would not just be between A (the putative owner of a piece of property) and B, but between A and all possible B's, a situation that would exponentially grow the social costs associated with settling property disputes. By locating the attributes of ownership within the property itself, however, the costs are linear, as each B who would challenge a use examines her claims against a single record of entitlements attached to the property itself. The goal of establishing this order is to create an efficient system of private ordering that is more likely than not to promote Pareto-optimal transfers (in theory, if not in practice). between individual actors' actions, legal institutions, and efficient outcomes. 15 Starting with a counterfactual world in which there are no transaction costs, he explains that legal institutions in such a world do not matter because individual actors will always engage in a series of transactions that result in all resources being put to their highest-value use. But, he goes on, because in the real world there are always transaction costs, well-designed legal institutions play a crucial role in ensuring optimal outcomes by reducing the transaction-cost impediments to efficient transfers. This perspective is very much in line with that of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, who similarly ascribed great importance to legal institutions.
More to the point, Coase's focus on transaction costs precisely captures why the relationship between classical liberalism and technology is so fascinating and important. As we discuss in Part II, new technology is often developed and adopted precisely because of its effects on transaction costs. But any change in the incidence or level of transaction costs can significantly alter the optimal initial assignment of rights to maximize the likelihood of voluntary exchange. This means that technology may disrupt the structure of the legal institutions necessary to facilitate efficient, welfare-enhancing outcomes. At the same time, the distribution of these effects is often uneven, across both the specific transactions that will be entered into, as well as the individuals who will benefit. This may further exacerbate the effects of technological disruptions upon existing legal institutions, creating the possibility that a technological advance could both dramatically benefit some parties but dramatically disadvantage 
II Why Technology Matters to Classical Liberalism
Technology in its broadest sense is merely the means by which we do things; technological advance is a change in the way we do things that increases benefit and/or lowers cost. The waterwheel allowed us to use a constant linear force (the flow of water) to drive a rotational shaft that, in turn, could be used to drive a range of tools. It was a vast improvement over human-or animal-powered machines. The advent of the steam engine offered even more benefit by allowing us to drive the same rotational shaft almost anywhere, without the need for a source of running water. The advent of the internal combustion engine, in turn, provided yet another improvement, allowing us to drive a rotational shaft on a more reliable and efficient scale. In the same way, the Internet is a technological evolution of the telephone, which is an evolution of the telegraph, which is an evolution of postal carriers, which is an evolution of private couriers -all technologies that allow individuals to communicate with one another at a distance. The story of technology is not necessarily all positive, however. Assessing the net effect of technological advance is particularly complicated by the possibility (or likelihood, even) that its effect on liberty, autonomy, and the institutional environment may simultaneously push in opposing directions.
For one thing, the benefits of technological advance or the problems that new technology can (or cannot) improve upon will inevitably fall unequally across members of society, thus altering, and often impeding, social, legal, commercial, or other relationships in unexpected ways. The advent of the waterwheel, for instance, endowed those near running water with benefits unavailable to others, and diverted economic resources away from activities that could not benefit from the operation of the waterwheel, all without respect to those activities' relative social value.
For another thing, technologies that benefit private parties and expand their liberties can also benefit government and expand its power (and constrict the populace's liberties). While the advent of the telephone, for example, certainly conferred enormous benefit and substantial liberty upon the populace, it also extended the reach of government and just as certainly facilitated to the rise of a more centralized and invasive state. In other words, although technological advance can (and usually does) increase overall social welfare in broad strokes, the political response to the redistribution of rights, power, and rents it may entail can lead to a net reduction in welfare -including through reductions in private ordering.
This problem is particularly acute in the case of implementations of technological innovation where the narrow redistribution of rents may be immediately apparent, but the broad, social benefits of new technology or new business models adapted to it may not be understood for some time. Importantly for a consequentialist approach like that of classical liberalism, this effect may be abetted by non-political actors including economists and legal scholars who tend to underappreciate the limits of their knowledge about novel technology and novel business arrangements. 21 Consider an important and contentious contemporary example: privacy.
Prior to the modern era in which a great number of social interactions are carried out online, it was relatively easy for individuals to keep information about themselves private and difficult for third parties (including the government) to observe and record that information. Today, by contrast, it is comparatively difficult for individuals to keep such information private and easy for third parties to observe and record that information. Despite changes in the value people attach to privacy that inevitably accompanied that evolution, changed technology may have shifted not only the efficient delineation of privacy rights (from a regime in which individuals were assumed to have waived control of information absent efforts to retain it to one in which they are instead assumed to retain control absent voluntary waiver of that control), but also the 21 See, for example, Ronald Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) ("[I] f an economist finds something -a business practice of one sort or another -that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.").
perception of the appropriateness of the resulting allocation of rights (such that a "correction" was required to shift from a presumption of waiver to a presumption of prohibition absent affirmative waiver). Regularly changing delineations of legal entitlements that may occur during periods of rapid technological change are potentially problematic for the very concept of property, reducing the durability of property rights, injecting uncertainty into the contours of ownership, and ultimately limiting the viability of private ordering. Indeed, even if these changed delineations improve overall efficiency in the allocation of entitlements, the mere fact of the change imposes transaction costs that can, in principle at least, be substantial. This is particularly the case where change is frequent, such that systems built upon long-term expectations of property delineations are kept constantly out of equilibrium.
Scholars have long recognized that legal institutions are shaped by technology and that changing technology may change those institutions. For instance, Roman citizens enjoyed a very different concept of "freedom of contract" than we do today; they were free to enter into any of a finite number of pre-defined contracts, but they were not free to draft contracts with their own bespoke terms. Today, largely any terms that can be rendered into recorded prose can be made contractually binding. The driving differences between these paradigms are the cost and availability of underlying technology: at Roman law, literacy was limited and it was costly and difficult to record terms; today literacy is assumed and recordation is widespread.
Similarly, at early English common law, courts recognized a finite number of forms of legal claims (trover, covenant, assumpsit, detinue, trespass, and 23 Id. at 193-211. replevin). These forms were recognized to standardize legal process: The costs of recording and transmitting precedent were high, so courts channeled precedent into standardized forms to reduce the burden upon jurists and counsellors to facilitate the development and uniformity of the law.
But this came at a cost. Courts would often find claims that could not be fit into one of the standard forms nonjusticiable. But as technology improved and the costs of recording and transmitting precedent decreased, common law courts starkly, the advent of the (inexpensive) portable camera, along with photographic paper and film rolls that enabled easy and cheap processing of photographic images, led to the extremely rapid and widespread diffusion of the ability to record and disseminate visual images in the late 1800s. As evidenced by the tone (and influence) of The Right to Privacy (published a scant two years after the invention of the Kodak) this led to the rapid and distinct disruption of the legal institutions surrounding privacy -a disruption that has continued through the development of modern technology and that we are still working to resolve today. In such a setting, technological change and legal institutions can easily be in tension. This tension is explored in Part III.
III Dueling Views of Contemporary Technology and the Law
Elements of classical liberal philosophy have featured prominently, if accidentally, in contemporary discussions of the regulation of technology.
Roughly mirroring the advent and growth of the commercial Internet, many technologists -and, in many ways, the tech industry writ large -have embraced various forms of liberty-focused, and generally liberty-maximal, philosophies. By and large, these individuals label themselves as libertarians of one form or another (whether libertarian, cyberlibertarian, cryptolibertarian, technolibertarian, cryptoanarchist, or some other variant). Although they rarely identify as "classical liberals" (indeed, it is likely that few are even familiar with that term), their priors are nonetheless closely related to those of classical liberals. These views, therefore, provide a useful survey of views on the contemporary relationship between technology, liberty, and the law.
The discussion that follows divides these views into two broad categories:
"extreme" and "moderate" libertarian views. In both cases the reference is to little-l libertarian, indicating that these are liberty-focused philosophies. The extreme libertarian view generally views technology as liberty-maximizing, so tends in turn to be strongly permissive of technological change. The moderate view also views technology as liberty-enhancing, but is more circumspect about technology's ability to undermine the protection of important autonomy values.
A The Extreme Libertarian Embrace of Technology
Libertarianism is related to, but (we contend) more restrictive than, classical liberal philosophy. In its more extreme form, it takes the preference for private ordering that classical liberalism rests upon and extends it to its maximum extent. Under this form -often referred to as a variant of anarchism or anarchocapitalism -the only morally acceptable order is the purely private order. The state, based as it is on a more-or-less involuntary premise (i.e., that it has a monopoly on the use of force, and an individual cannot opt out of it) is to be avoided as a source for rule making and enforcement.
In the contemporary technological setting, this branch of thought often falls into one of three categories: cyberutopianism, cyberexceptionalism, or cyberanarchism. These are not meant to be precisely defined categories -indeed, there is substantial overlap between each. But this categorization typifies key features of contemporary, extreme libertarian views on technology. Many of these problems don't exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.
* * *
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. * * * We must declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts. 24 Barlow's views captured the zeitgeist of the moment -a sincere belief that "cyberspace" was a new and better place than the physical world. It was a place in which individuals could explore and express their liberty in the purest and most extreme forms possible, and could do so free of the constraints of the physical world or territorial governments -and possibly even without concern for encroaching upon the autonomy interests of others. 25 Today, the utopianism of Barlow's vision of the cyber has fallen from its once dominant intellectual position, though strands of it remain in the cyberanarchist perspective (discussed below). Rather, as the Internet grew in social, economic, and political importance -and, importantly, as the Internet came to distinguish itself more for its transformative ability to facilitate (and extend) the same sorts of social interactions that occurred offline, rather than as the birthplace of an entirely new kind of social order -the same social, economic, and political institutions important in the offline world naturally came to exert influence in the online world. These efforts occurred largely through the 24 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996) This view is focused almost entirely on the positive value of innovation, holding that the gains from innovation will tend to overwhelm any potentially complicating realities, or that potential complications will themselves be addressed by subsequent innovation. Thus, Internet platforms should be permitted to experiment with new services without ex ante constraint, even though we understand, for example, that third-parties often use these platforms for illicit purposes. The exceptionalist perspective is that concern about those illicit uses does not justify placing any limits on the development of new technological platforms.
The advent of the automobile, for instance, was overwhelmingly positive for society, even though it upended much of tort law. Likewise, the advent of driverless cars will certainly lead to new ways for people to be injured and hard questions for the law in assessing and apportioning liability for those injuriesbut it will likely make automobiles substantially safer than they are today and increase the efficiency (and decrease the costs) of driving so substantially that we should push ahead in the development of the new technology and address such concerns once the technology has arrived.
Similarly, the Internet has unquestionably been one of the most beneficial and important developments in the history of humankind -but it has also facilitated child pornography and other forms of exploitation on a scale never before known. The exceptionalist perspective is that the new technology should But this view is also autonomy-agnostic. It pays no heed to concerns that a given technology may tend to be used to cause harm to its users or to third parties, and expressly argues that harmed parties be denied recourse against the implementers of the technology for such harms. Importantly, this is the case even where future harms are predictable, and even where the technology is developed in such a way that it makes it particularly easy for parties to be harmed or difficult for them to seek redress. In other words, under dominant cyberexceptionalist views, platforms and intermediaries are under no obligation to design their technologies in ways that prevent harm, allow for recovery when harm occurs, or even facilitate action being taken against the party causing harm. 30 30 Again, this approach largely harkens back to the cyberutopian view that in a very real sense traditional conceptions of "harm" do not apply online, because cyberspace is not bound by the physical or social constraints of the real world that prevent a harmed party from removing themselves from a harmful situation or engaging in self-help.
The third category of extreme libertarian views on technology is different in kind, although it draws on ideas from both cyberutopianism and cyberexceptionalism. Cyberanarchism views technology as a remedy against the sins of the state. This view is particularly prevalent in contemporary discussions about privacy, surveillance, encryption, and cryptocurrencies. Cyberanarchism views government surveillance in particular -whether through wiretaps and warrants, the intelligence community, collection of public information, or issuance of subpoenas to collect information from private platforms -as an undue encroachment on individual autonomy and an impermissible limit on liberty. Technology can and should be used to frustrate these governmental functions, thereby enhancing liberty.
There is, of course, an obvious trade-off with such an approach.
Cryptocurrencies, for instance, were developed at least in part to provide an anonymous and largely untraceable alternative to fiat currency and traditional online payment systems. In many contexts anonymity in financial transactions is valuable, of course, but cryptocurrencies can be and are used to facilitate harmful or criminal conduct. Likewise, TOR and other encryption technologies have enabled individuals to trade illicit goods and services as well as nonillicit goods and services under anonymous conditions. Privacy-enhancing encryption technologies are also broadly seen as tools to circumvent state restrictions on speech (particularly in hostile regimes), and to avoid state surveillance.
Although it is true to some extent for all of the different strains of the extreme libertarian view, for privacy and cryptocurrency advocates, in particular, technology is viewed as a means for resisting any government Cal. 2016) . Although arguably resting on fairly well-established legal footing, the court's order, based on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, was met with cries of outrage from certain technolibertarian quarters. This outrage, again, was premised on the idea that there is something unusual about data and digital devices that warrants a completely different legal treatment. But, as with other instances of such extreme cyberexceptionalism, the explanation about just why it is that technology should be in a legal class of its own was never adequately explained.
technology is, at root, nothing special, insofar as classical liberals do not presume that any social construct should receive a per se different treatment under the law.
The moderate libertarian view admits room for the state to establish a framework of neutrally administered and enforced rules against which individuals arrange their private ordering. Technology is evaluated by its effects upon the rule-based expectations of individuals, and is not regarded as inherently outside of (but acting upon) the legal order. Fundamental to this approach is the view that technology is not regarded as exceptional in any a priori sense; it matters only how it is used or how it affects the optimal institutional ordering. Technological innovations do often offer significant benefits (not only in terms of liberty and autonomy, but general consumer welfare), of course, and any benefits arising from the adaptation and application of existing legal rules should be weighed against the possible costs of deterring the creation or welfare-enhancing deployment technology. But in principle any technology, no matter how revolutionary, can be brought within the ambit of predictable, neutrally administered legal rules.
One key component of the moderate libertarian view is that immunity from established legal principles should not be assumed even if extension of those principles to new technology requires novel applications of common law precedents, or even the adoption of new regulations or legislation. Internet platforms, for example, may entail a different liability structure, but there is no
reason to believe that they should engender no liability as a result.
Unlike the more extreme approaches, the moderate libertarian approach to technology would not inherently object to extraterritorial application of a country's laws, for example, as is often necessitated on the Internet. While cloudbased activity and cross-border data flows can be particularly complicated to untangle, this does not mean that territorial courts should be presumed unable to adjudicate disputes arising out of multi-nation digital trade. Courts are skilled at parsing conflicts of laws, as well as parsing facts in complex or difficult cases.
Determining jurisdictional competencies for Internet-based disputes is only a difference of degree, not of kind.
Similarly, under the moderate libertarian view, technologies that are used to secure privacy online or in the cloud will have to yield in some cases to the needs of the state, just as in the offline context. For instance, although the answer may not be to build in purposeful security holes such as back doors, in cases where a firm could theoretically help override encryption, as in the Apple-San
Bernardino dispute, 33 they can lawfully be required to do so.
Intellectual property ("IP") draws into stark relief the distinction between the hard-core and more-moderate libertarian approaches. IP presents a rather unique circumstance. By defining a property right around a novel technological idea (patent) or original expression, including of technologically sophisticated software code (copyright), IP comes close to treating technological advance itself (as opposed to the use or implementation of technology) as exceptional. 34 In this 33 See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Encryption Congress mod (Apple + CALEA), 30 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 355 (2017) . 34 It is important to note, however, that (under US law, at least) both patent and copyright law encompass core elements that mitigate this exceptionalism to some extent. For an idea (invention) to be granted a patent, for sense, it could be argued, the mere definition of IP rights represents a problematic extension of the legal order beyond a system necessary for mitigating transaction costs to one that inherently curtails liberty regardless of countervailing social gain: Because IP rights are granted before any welfareimproving transaction is undertaken, even essentially valueless technology can receive IP protection, subject only to the (largely arbitrary) cost to an applicant of obtaining it. 35 For moderate libertarians, however, a system of IP rights readily overcomes this apparent defect.
Not surprisingly, however, the hard-core libertarian argument against IP extends from precisely this apparent quirk. Hard-core libertarians generally advance two arguments against IP. First, IP is a creation of government: As suggested above, not only the ex post regulation of technology, but its very example, it needs to be useful: It cannot exist merely as an abstract idea, but must be a functional "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. And for original works to receive a copyright they must be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression … from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Again, it is clear from this statutory limitation that abstractions per se will not receive protection unless they are actually implemented in a useful form. Nevertheless, these eligibility requirements do not entirely undermine the idea that "technology," rather than "the use of technology" is protected by IP rights because, once the conditions of eligibility are met, IP protections extend beyond those limitations to restrict others' implementation of the new technology. 35 Because copyright attaches automatically to any original expression once it is fixed in a tangible medium, even this limitation doesn't exist. Of course, the investment required (including opportunity costs) to create a patentable invention or copyrightable work acts as a limitation, as well, and one that is decidedly more closely related to expected social value. But even ideas discovered accidentally and (nearly) trivial works of authorship are still eligible for protection, so there remains a significant scope for legal constraints to attach even without any indication of their social value. No one can defend any system of property rights, whether for tangible or intangible objects, on the naïve view that it produces all gain and no pain. Every system of property rights necessarily creates some winners and some losers. Recognize property rights in land, and the law makes trespassers out of people who were once free to roam. We choose to bear these costs … because we make the strong empirical judgment that any loss of liberty is more than offset by the gains from manufacturing, agriculture and commerce that exclusive property rights foster.
These gains, moreover, are not confined to some lucky few who first get to occupy land. No, the private holdings in various assets create the markets that use voluntary exchange to spread these gains across the entire population … [T]he inconveniences [IP] generates are fully justified by the greater prosperity and wellbeing for the population at large. 37
It is also important to note that the presumed "monopoly" granted by IP rights is not actually a monopoly in any meaningful sense. Because patent rights and copyrights are limited in both time and scope, they do not foreclose the development and implementation of competing ideas or competing expressions any more than the owner of a single house can avoid competition from her neighbors. Not that it requires an Uber to see that taxi medallions are almost certainly examples of the latter, and not the former. They constrain nonmedallion holders' liberty without even facilitating value-maximizing transactions for those who hold them. But it does often take an Uber to bring into relief the but-for world that such laws deter. Absent this information, the classical liberal approach is far less likely to succeed in influencing law and policy -in overcoming the politics and rent-seeking that prop up welfarelimiting or -reducing laws or allow them to come into existence in the first place.
There is thus a second-order -and ironic -benefit to the more extreme libertarian position, which would, at the margin, enable deployment of more disruptive technologies, some number of which will confer this political economy benefit -improving the reliability of the law -independent of the direct benefits they may also entail.
If the extreme position can be too … extreme, the moderate position can be too cautious, overweighting present autonomy interests (the protection of existing property rights and the ability for their holders to demand license) and underweighting future liberty interests (the ability to undermine existing property rights for the sake of dynamic efficiency gains). But unless we are able to reduce transaction costs far beyond what is likely, the optimal classical liberal position will still require background rules: So long as transaction costs exist, rules will be required and the challenge will be to implement the rules that yield the most efficient of outcomes. evolutionary systems adapt to technological (and other) changes over time, maintaining relative constancy, minimizing the frustration of expectations, and eschewing preemptive constraints that may turn out to be inefficient or otherwise undesirable. But statutory rules of general applicability also evolve through iterated judicial enforcement (in part in response to technological changes), and also effect an allocation of property rights and set expectations. 40 While the slow, deliberate evolution of the common law is certainly preferable, where they exist, the relative constancy of these longstanding statutory schemes is similarly important in maintaining the background rules against which transactions take place.
The central tension here is that classical liberalism posits the need for legal institutions to promote private ordering, but these institutions themselves are often established, maintained, enforced, and updated through a process of public ordering. Indeed, even institutions that evolve through private ordering quickly take on a public character in any society beyond a trivial level of complexity. 41 And such rules can easily fall victim to the perils of public choice, erring on the side of excessive constraint due to limited knowledge, an excess of caution (the so-called precautionary principle), and the lure of rent extraction. 40 The operative language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, for example, comprises the following: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1. The courts have, for the 125 or so years of the law's existence, been responsible for interpreting the law and giving it its real content (subject, of course, to the strong influence of enforcement agencies' exercise of their prosecutorial discretion). 41 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) ; ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
The very rules that classical liberalism depends upon in order to ensure private ordering and autonomy can be captured through public means to limit private ordering and undermine autonomy. The extreme libertarian position has the undeniable virtue that it is a purely private mechanism, one that can disrupt legal institutions that have lost their way -even if that disruption has great costs.
So too does the classical liberal's common affinity for the common law -an institution in which changes to the law are predicated on private disputes, which serves to check the problematic characteristics of public ordering. 42 
Conclusion
Classical liberalism is often conflated with libertarianism, and, on issues relating to technology, libertarianism writ large is often conflated with particular strains of anarcho-capitalism and techno-and crypto-libertarianism. These strains embrace extreme views of the liberty-enhancing potential of technology. But they are also in tension with the classical liberal acceptance of a minimal set of legal institutions as necessary to protect individual autonomy and promote stable private ordering. Indeed, the hallmark of much of the techno-libertarian ideal is disruption -including disruption of the very institutions that classical liberalism identifies as necessary in order to promote individual liberty and social welfare. 42 See, for example, Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC's UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA LAW REVIEW 955, 981 (2016) (discussing that, while common law judges do make law, "they do not embrace this function warmly," and the various obstacles that exist to limit the scope of judicial rule making).
This suggests tensions between the classical liberal and the ascendant libertarian impulses that drive many in the modern technology sphere. These tensions are real. But the greater tensions are within classical liberalism itself.
Classical liberalism accepts -even posits -the need for legal institutions, but does not provide an endogenous explanation for the origins, extent, or nature of those institutions. Contemporary thinkers in the classical liberal tradition are likely to ground these institutions in welfare and transaction cost economics. But technological changes can lead to meaningful changes in transaction costs and shifts in the allocation of social welfare (that is, the efficient ordering of private resources). In other words, technology is exogenous to the principles of classical liberalism, such that the fundamental institutions of classical liberalism are themselves defined (at least in part) exogenously. This leads to the peculiar result that, lacking internal principles to guide the private ordering of its institutions, classical liberalism must rely in part on a public ordering of the institutions that govern the private ordering that it seeks to facilitate.
The modern era of disruptive technology has magnified this tension.
There is little question that much of modern technological advance ends up enhancing liberty and promoting private ordering. But disruption almost by definition implies winners and losers, and the spoils of disruption do not necessarily fall efficiently, either to the winners or the losers. The classical liberal prefers Pareto efficient transactions, and is relatively averse to transactions that are merely Kaldor-Hicks efficient. But technological advance -and especially disruptive advance -places us squarely in the uncomfortable realm of KaldorHicks efficiency: Either we allow disruption, allowing harm to those disrupted; or we deny disruption, denying benefits to would-be disruptors. Without both a sense of the magnitude of harm and an efficient means by which to compensate for it, we are no longer operating in the realm of voluntary private orderingthat is, in the realm of classical liberalism.
The safest response to this conundrum for the committed classical liberal is likely to recommit to the basic principle of simple rules developed through the common-law mechanism. These are least likely to be disrupted and most likely to transfer relatively unscathed between technological regimes. Too often legal institutions have embraced complexity, either on their own or in response to specific technologies. Such complexity runs counter to classical liberalism and compounds the confounding conundrum that technology poses to principle.
Instead, when confronted with technological change, classical liberalism's future more likely lies in its past. As usual, Richard Epstein got things right: "The proper response to more complex societies should be ever greater reliance on simple legal rules, including older rules too often and too easily dismissed as curious relics of some bygone horse-and-buggy age." 43
